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THE INFANT AND HIS TORTS.
Infancy.
Infancy is that stage of a human being's life,
wherein, by reason of his youth, he is :7ot Tresumed, by law,
to have reached that maturity of min, which should make him
calable of judging and acting for himself. All minds are
not the same. Some mat,-'e eozrlie-r than others. Therefore
many infants are as caT-able of choosing for themselves at the
ae of fifteen years, as other& at the age of twenty-one.
But the la. canniot loo: to every individual and decide his
case separately. We Qust for convenience and stability fix
upon sc-ne a-e -'cclarc overy -ercon to be at his majority
upon attainirg suoh age. ob 7 the la-T of the early Romeans,
we find that tho female xx~r suble t to e-cetual guardianship
and lc's ncver allo:e, -elr _ ajorit , excert wVhen she married.
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This state of affo ir- -1 m ally changcd, an-7 at thne time of
Justinian, by the civil 1 y, botI- the LFer-le cn the male
were considcrC'-_ at their r.ao-itc l-:oi r o tic age of
twent:-fivo years. By the Co:7:fon Law of Englail, according
to .lackstone. "tqe fal agc in male or fe:nale is twenty-one
years, wvhich age is -ora:lcted on the day preceding the anniver-
sary of a yeroson's birth, who until that ti:'le is an infant,
and so styled in la,:. " Infancy is :,rivileged by the law.
The person under t- onty-one ycars of age, by the la,; of Englam.
and America is exe L-,t for the nost -art from cont-r _.ct lia-
bility. At a cert .in stage of infancy the rerson is con-
clusively presumed incapable of cOT.L:.itting crime. Whether or
not the infant is liable for his tort it is mainly our pur-
pose to investigate and determine.
Prevailing Dinion that the Father is Liable.-
At the vcry out-set of this -iscussion there is a snag to be
encountered. it is the wide spread iea among the laymen,
that the father is responsible for the torts of his minor
child. Remarkable as this may seem, considering that the law
has been settled upon this -oint for so many years, neverthe-
less, we find it true. if a child go down town and break in
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the glass front to a .orchant's store, the merchant, in nine
cases out of te, will beliove himself to have a full re-
covery in damages against the child's father. And the father
also will believe himself liable, and upon being presented
with the bill will pay it. Perhals this cor.,.mon opinion may
be said to come from the beliof that the father is solely
responsible for the bei-'ig of the child, that the child is
brought into the world for personal gratification of the
parent and that he should watch over and educate him in what
his right and wro-g;', that the tort or 7-ron- of the child may
be trace-I bac}: to the neglect of the parent in such edu-
cation; and that, therefore the parent should be made to suf-
fer and so be held rcopponsible for the tort. if this be the
foundation for this yrevailing notion, it is unsound,- the
child is not brought into this world simply through per-
sonal gratification of the parent, but because of a duty owing
to mankind. To cause the child to be perretually watched
would impair him for society, and to im-ose upon the parent
this duty would be absurd. That a father should be held re-
sponsible for the wrongful acts of his infant child would also
put the future of the father in constant peril. But the law
star--ed this octrinc as unsound.
Remedy -ivcn at Early Roman La':.- It is true that
in the earlr Roman Laj, there .ias a remedy against the father
for the tort of the child. When an injury was done by the
child, the father could either pay damages or surrender up
the chil. But at this -(--Jod it must be remembered that
the child was consiaiered but little better than the slave,
that the same remedy was given against the master for the
tort of his slave, as for the tort of his child, and that
there was no remedy against the child or slave. Later the
child was considered as something better, and it was not re-
quired that he should be surrcnc. upon the co=ission of
a wron'g. The general rrinciz.!e of the Roman Law "That
every person is responsible, not only for i -.n.uries cause by
his own act, but for all th.t are caused by the act of persons
and things under his dominion,' is adopted in the Civil Code
of France (Article 1384), but, the father is not held liable
for the tort of his chilo :hich he was not able to prevent;
and the same intcr-retation is given to this :rinciple in
the State of La., in w.hose code it has been also adopted.
(Cleveland v. Ulayo, 19 La., 414; Governor v. Lambeth, 9 La.,
241).
At the Enrglish Lam,, the' re is no Reme.dy against the
Father.- As a -oneral pro?,,osition, it may be saAd that; at
the English Law thore is no Resj onsibliity placed up:on the
Father for the torts of his infant fchild. The English
courts are quite emphatic upon this point; and in one case
a modern one 7ecided in the year 1860, the court went very
close to the region, where the em:rloyer should be held liable
for the torts of his employee, committed while acting in his
service, and declared the father exemrpt. This was the case
of Moon v. Tiners (8 C.B.(N.S.) 611).:- The action was for
trespass and false imprisonment. The facts are these; The
defendant's' son was wa-ng for hin as treasurer of his
Theatre. The proIxrty man of the Theatre, was alleged, by
the son, to have embezzled the funds and was thereupon taken
before a magistrate who remanded but ultimately discharged
him. After the remand the son told' his father what he had
done. The father did not prohibit 4he son from proceeding.
In the opinion the Court said:- "! am riot a'.:are of any such
relation between a father and son, thou,"h the son be living
with his father as a member of his family, as I:iA make the
--
acts of the son more binding upon the f ther than the acts
of anybody else. I ayrrehond, that when it is established
that a father is not liable upon contracts mrade by his son
within age, except they be for nec&7saries, it would be going
against the whole tenor of the law to hold him liable for
his son's trespasses. No man ought, as a general rule,
to be responsible for acts not his o::."
The same principle v!hich is given for the English
Law will be found to govern in the majority of the states of
the Union. Let us look at some of the cases. In 4 Denio,
175, Tifft v. Tifft, the ;laintiff brought an action for
damages against the father of a minor daughter, because of
the child's having set a dog ovned by the father upon a
neighbor's hog, and hilling it. The court said;- "The de-
fendant was not answerable for the act of his daughter done
in his absence and without his authority or approval." The
case of Baker v. Halderman, 24 o., 219, was an action to
recover damages for assault uon the mincr chili of the -lain-
tiff by the minor child of the defendant. The petition of
the plaintiff, in this action, statc "that the son of the
defendant became and was dangerous to the plaintiff and her
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children by reason of his viscious and destructive temper and
of his sudden and causeless fits of anger, and that the
plaintiff notifi(ed the cefcnrant of said fact, and desired
him to restrain and con 4rol '-is son, to the end that she and
her children might live in safety; that said defendant failed
and neglected to restrain and control -lis said son, and that
in consequence of such failure and Jeglect iaid injury re-
sulted." The retition s demurred to by the defendant, on
the ground that the father was not responsible for injuries
caused by an assault made by his ainor child. The demurer
was sustained. This dase decides for us, that the child is
not to be loohed upon as the dog or other animal; that al-
though the owner may be held liable for the injuries inflicted
by his dog, which he kne: to be viscious, not so for the in-
juries committed by his child. These cases will suffice to
show the law as it stands to day in this country, and we may
consider them as showing the principle waich has been adopted
in the different atates of the Union.
Excertions to General Rule.- Having found the
general -Irinciple to be as above we Ywili now consider what
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are called by some writers and cited in some cases, Decis-
ions to the Contrary, or Exceptions. It shall be tried
to show that these, however, are only apparent excertions
and that they leave the general ,-riici-le unharmed. Thaus
in a Penn. case (39 Pa. ,177) the father w,_s held liable for
injuries done by reason of a collision between his wagon and
that of the plaintiff's, caused by his son's negligent and
reckless driving, the father being seated all the while be-
side his son and permitting the same. In this case, it was
not the tort of the infant which was the true ground of the
decision, but it vwas the negligence of the father in permit-
ting his son to be so reckless while he could easily have
prevented him from being so, which caused his liability.
It was the tort of the father and not that of the son which
was the true basis of the decision. If the father had not
been present, in this case, and helped about the commission
of the injury, he would not have been held responsible.
Another instance where the father has been liable, is where
the wrong is done at his express cori.mand. The same reason-
ing will apply in this case as in the other; it is the fatherl
own wrong for which he is made responsible. By running
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through the cases we will find that, whore the father is not
present when the wrong is committed, and when he could not
prevent the wrong from being comiitted, he is exempt from lia-
bility. (46 Mie., 302)
Under circumstances where he can prevent the in-
jury is he not himself guilty of the tort negligence?
Suprosod Analogy between the Relation of Man and
Wife--and Parent and Child.- Before leaving the subject of
the Parent's Liability it may be well to look at the analogy
which by some is supposed to exist between the Relation of
Parent and Child, and that of Husband and ife. The ques-
tion may be ashed,- Why, since at the Common Law, the hus-
band v'as held liable for the torts of his wife, should he
not be held responsible for those of his minor child? And
it may be answered in this way: that the husband upon marrying
came into -ossess ion and right of all the wife's property.
The personal property became his absolutely and the use of
the realty was given him during life. In order o hold
anyone, therefore, it must be the husband. MTaile in the
relation existing between the parent and his child we find no
such condition of 7ffairs. The father was not entitled to
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more than hawageF of the chili. In the former case, since
to ok
the husbandall the property, it was no .,ore than fair that
he should be held liable; while, in the latter case, ,ye find
no such reason. If the child is entitled to his Troperty,
whi not bring the action gainst him? To sustain this
argument that it was the right of the husband in the property
of the wife which caused his liability for the torts of the
wife, YOe have only to look., at the .present day, in the states
where statutes have been passed taking these property rights
away. Here we will find that the -:usba-cd is no longer lia-
ble for the wife's torts.
That the infant is liable, for torts comnnitted by
himself, is well settled in the Un.ited States and England.-
23 N.H., 507; 2 Kent's Co=-., 241; 3 Wend., 391; 3 McCord,
257; 9 N.H., 441; 10 Vt., 71; 8 T.R., 335; 16 Mass., 089;
17 'is., 231; 14 C.B.(N.S.), 45; 107 Mass., 251.
Intent.- For those torts in which merely force is
involved and no maliciousness is present, the infant has been
held responsible at any age and vitbout regard to the intent
with which they were committed. The law is inclined to
look at the injury done and not the intent. Mr. Tyler, in
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his work on says:- "Infants arc liable at any age,
for in case of civil injuries with force the intention is
not regardodf, and cites 29 Bar'., 218. In . 'isconsin case,
17 Wis., 231, a child under the age of seven years was held
liable in trespass for breahing down the shrubbery and flowers
of amghbor's flower garden.
But in those cases where malice is a necessary in-
gredient in the tort, the infant is no longer by the weight
of authority, held responsible, where, by reason of his youth,
he could not have been c-.pable of bearing such malice.
Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts, section 120, says:-
"In those cases in which malice is a necessary ingredient in
the wrong, an infant may or may not be liable according as
hid age and capacity may justify iuiputing malice to him or
preclude the idea of his indulging it. The case of the al-
leged defamation affords a suitable illustration, the absur-
dity of a suit against a child of three years old will be
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slifficiently manifest, but not more so than the granting of
immunity to the malicious utterances of a youth of twenty.
And while it would be imyoscible to name any age which should
constitute the dividing line betwren res: nsibility and ir-
responsibility, in these and all siTmilar cases, there would
be no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that for all ma-
licious injuries the wrong doer should be held responsible
if he has arrived at an age and a maturity of nind which
should render him morally responsible for the consequences of
intentional action. All general statements that an infant
is responsible like any other person for his torts, are to be
received with the qualification that the tort must hot be one
involving an element which in his -articular case must be
wanting. If a child less than seven years cannot be held
responsible for larceny because of defect of understaiding
and incapacity to harbor a felriious intent, it would seem
preposterous to hold him respansible for his slander, the
moral quality of which he would be much less likely to ap-
preciate, and injury from which must be -urely imaginary.",
I have been able to find no cases upon this roint but believe
Mr. Cooley to be correct.
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Neg ligencc.- As in the cases -.h':^e malice is in-
volved so wherc injuries a-,e caused 4>. ne-lLgence it is the
tendency of the court at the ::resent dey , to '-old infants of
tender age exempt from liability. A definition of negli-
gences has been -iven thus:- "Negligence is an inadvertant act
or omission in a responsible "_',a1 being, whilo un-aged in a
lawful employment, that produces as a natural result damages
to another which might have been avoided by the use of or-
dinary care." From this definition we can see that the
test to be used .in cases of uelgcnce, is: was there a
"want of ordina-y care?" The infant of tender years does
-ot hno T;hat ordinary care is, and to hold him responsible
for n t using it, is against reas:cn.
Underhill in his or o. Torts says:- There is a
conflict in the cases in the 'Jnited5 State7 upon the question
as to whether the same degree of care is to be exacted from a
child of tender years, as from an adult" and he says that,
"the best oiinicn is that he is n ot," and cites 53 Ala., 70;
65 Ala., 506; 52 Cfl., 032; 78 Ill., 88; 5 A.e 14;
148 note; 45 ',Zo., 70; 64 60.Y., 03; N.11. , 320.--Let us
1:0: at the last case cited,
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60 N.Y., 326. In this case a child eight or nine years old
attempted to cross a street railroad and was struck and in-
jured. Action was brought on behalf of the chill for the in-
jury sustained, and for defense, the company put in that the
child was guilty of contributory negligence and so was not
entitled to recover. The court said:- "The degree of care
required of an infant of tender years, the omission of which
will constitute negligence on his part, is entirely different
froii- that required of an adult. It is to be measured in
each case by the maturity and cepacity of the individual,
the la,: only requiring the degree of care -e be reasonably
expected in view thereof.,' The child recovered damages.
The doctrine of Respondeat Superior cannot apply to
Infants, because of their incapacity to contract. Robins
v. Mount, 4 Robt., 553; 33 Hun Pr., 34.
Exeel tion to the Rule that the Infant is liable for
his Torts no matter what be the Age. Torts which result
from Contracts.
Blac'-stone says that:- "In some cases, a tort is
connected with a contract, and an infant is then held irre-
sponsible, whenever to hold him liable on the ground of tort
would be virtually to render him responsible upon his con-
tract obl-iation." The courts will not allow a person to
enforce his contract obligation by bringing an action of
tort against the infant. So it -.%as held, that when a boy
hired a horse and injured it while overdriving that there was
only a breach of contract and that the child was not answer-
able for tort. Again where in exchanging horses the infant
fraudulently warranted his mare to be eound, he was protected
from the consequences on the same y.rinci~le. S T.& R., 333;
2Marsh, 485; 4 Cams., 118; 19 Vt., 505. The English
Courts favored this rule exceedingly and at one time showed
a tendency to carry it too far. Thus in 1.Manby v. Scott,
where goods had been delivered to an infant, and a suit was
brought for trover and conversion, the court said:- "The in-
fant shall not be chargeable for by that means all infants in
England would be ruined." The later L'n-lish cases show a
disposition to hold the infant liable for his wilfull torts,
-is-
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even though they be committed during a contract relation.
The case of 1laggis v. Burnard, 14 C.D.(N.S. ), 45, will ji-
lustrate this matter,--A young man twenty years of age hired
a horse of a liveryman to ride, and he was expressly told
that the horse was not to be used for jumping purposes. Upon
getting the horse the infant did use it to jump with and
thereby killed the animal. In this case there was not simply
a breach of contract, but there vwas a decided and wilful wrong
committed. Jumping the horse was acting entirely contrary
to the purpose for which the horse was bailed. The test in
such a case as this is; "Has there been a departu e from the
cantract? Has there been a wilful wrong committed?
It has been held that conversion will lLe against
the infant, although the goods converted were in the possession
of the infant at the time they were converted, 6 Cranich., 226i-
2 Wend., 137; 15 Mich., 233; 32 Vt., 217.
Detinue has been held to lie against an infant,
where goods were delivered for a specific purpose not accom-
plished. 4 B.& P., 140.
As to the question of fraud practiced in the crea-
tion of the contract, the authritie? are not agreed. In
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New York State, and some other states, an infant is held lia-
ble in tort for obtaining gocd on crecit, intending not to
pay for them. 5 Hill, 391; 59 Ill., 341; 3 Pick., 492.
In Vermont, it has been hceld that the -'l-a of in-
fancy will prevail when the graveren of the action of the
fraud consists in a transaction which really originate in
contract. 38 V., 311.
The bettor view of the question of fraud connected
with contract is found in the case of Fitts v. Hall, 9 N.H.,
441.-- In this case an infant obtained ggods upon is
falsely representing himself to be of age. Judge Parker in
the opinion said:- "The principle seems to be that if the tort
or fraud of an infant arises from a breach of contr'act, al-
though there may have been false representations or conceal-
ments respecting the subject matter of it, the infant cannot
be charged for this breach of his -ro-iise or contract by a
change in the form of the action. But if -"the tort is
subsequesnt to the contract and not a mere brcach of it, but
a distinct, wilful and positive wrong itself, then, although
it may be connected with the contract, the infant is liable."
The representation in Johnson v. Tye, and in the rresent
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case, that the defendant xzas of full wc, :as not part of the
contract, nor did it grow out of the contract or in any way
result from it. It is not any part of its terms, nor was
it the consideration upon which the contract woits founded.
No contract was made about the 7efendant's age. The sale
of the goods was not a conigomeration for the affirmation
or representation. The representation was not a foundation
for an action of Assumpsit. The matter arises purely ex de-
licto. The fraud wDns intended to induce, and did induce the
plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of lots, but that
by no means makes it a part and parcel of the contract. It
was antecedent to the contract, and if an infa nt is liable
for a jositive wrong connected with the contract, but arising
after the contract has been made, he may well be answerable
for one committed before the contract was entered into, al-
though it may have led to the contract.," This is the doc-
trine established in the state of New YorL 5 Hill, 391,-
and also in Indiana Rice v. Boyer, 118 Ind., 472.
The Editor's of the American Leading Cases, claim
this doctrine to be unsound. Saying that "the representation
by itself, was not actionable, for it was not an injury and
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the evidence of the conti-act v:hich made it so, nor the exercis
of a legal right on the rart of the infant. " ------- The
test in an action 7gainst an infant is, whether a liability
can be made out without tam ing notice of the contract."
I believe xit> Itr. Parson that the editors of the Lead-
ing American Cases :.istooh the real ground of the decision
in this case which was that a fraudulent repreventation,
whereby n: oney or goods are obtained by an infant, is an
actionable injury. I Parson on Contracts, 7 Ed. 317 note.
See Walher v. Davis, 1 N.Y., 806; 23 Vt., 350; 5 Hill, 391.
However, the majority of the decisions are contra to
the above.

